Note, Statutes of Limitations in Civil Rights Actions - A Survey and Critique of Tenth Circuit Decisions by Bayaz, Marcie
Denver Law Review 
Volume 61 
Issue 2 Tenth Circuit Surveys Article 7 
February 2021 
Note, Statutes of Limitations in Civil Rights Actions - A Survey and 
Critique of Tenth Circuit Decisions 
Marcie Bayaz 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.du.edu/dlr 
Recommended Citation 
Marcie Bayaz, Note, Statutes of Limitations in Civil Rights Actions - A Survey and Critique of Tenth Circuit 
Decisions, 61 Denv. L.J. 187 (1984). 
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Denver Law Review at Digital Commons @ DU. It has 
been accepted for inclusion in Denver Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital Commons @ DU. For more 
information, please contact jennifer.cox@du.edu,dig-commons@du.edu. 
NOTE, STATUTES OF LIMITATIONS IN CIVIL RIGHTS
ACTIONS-A SURVEY AND CRITIQUE OF TENTH
CIRCUIT DECISIONS
OVERVIEW
Congress' failure to specify a statute of limitations for cases brought
under the Civil Rights Acts' has presented numerous difficulties for the fed-
eral courts. The Supreme Court in O'Sullivan v. Fehx2 approved the applica-
tion of state statutes of limitations to civil rights actions.3 In Board of Regents
v. Tomanzo, 4 the Court held that 42 U.S.C. § 19885 required application of
state statutes of limitations.6 The Court, however, has provided little gui-
dance to the lower courts as to which state statute of limitations is most
appropriate.7 This lack of guidance8 has led to divergent approaches among
the circuit courts9 and, in some instances, to the application of different ap-
proaches within the same circuit.1 0
1. During the the Civil War era, Congress enacted a series of civil rights statutes which
are collectively referred to as the Civil Rights Acts. See Comment, Statutes of Liitattin in Federal
Civil Rhts Litiation, 1976 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 98, 98 & n.l. The four Civil War civil rights statutes
relevant to this comment are codified in title 42 of the United States Code. 42 U.S.C. § 1981
(1976) guarantees all citizens the right to contract, and the protection of the legal process, on
the terms enjoyed by white citizens. 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1976) guarantees all citizens the prop-
erty rights enjoyed by white citizens. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Supp. V 1981) creates a civil remedy for
persons deprived of federally secured rights by other persons acting under color of state law. 42
U.S.C. § 1985 (Supp. V 1981) creates a civil remedy for injury caused by conspiracies to deprive
a person's civil rights, or to interfere with the equal administration of the law.
2. 233 U.S. 318 (1914).
3. Id. at 321-25. Felix held that because civil suits under the Civil Rights Acts are reme-
dial in nature, a federal statute governing civil actions imposing fines or penalties was inapplica-
ble. Given the absence of an explicit limitations period in the Civil Rights Acts, the district
court properly applied a state limitation period. Id.
4. 446 U.S. 478 (1980).
5. 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (Supp. V 1981).
6. The court held that section 1988 requires application of state statutes of limitation
unless the state law is "inconsistent with the constitution and the laws of the United States."
Board of Regents v. Tomanio, 446 U.S. 478, 483-85 (1980). One commentator has concluded
that section 1988 has been misinterpreted by the courts and that Congress never intended to
incorporate state rules into federally created actions. Eisenberg, State Law in Federal Civil Rights
Cases.- The Proper Scope of Section /988, 128 U. PA. L. REV. 499 (1980).
7. In the leading case of Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454 (1975),
the Court stated that the limited grant of certiorari foreclosed consideration of which state
statute of limitation should be applied to an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1981. 421 U.S. at 462
n.7. In another section 1981 case, the Court also declined to examine the statute of limitations
issue, stating: "We are not disposed to displace the considered judgment of the Court of Appeals
on an issue whose resolution is so heavily contingent upon an analysis of state law. Run-
yon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 181 (1976).
8. The Court has stated that the federal courts should adopt the most analogous state
statute of limitations. Tomano, 446 U.S. at 483-84. This statement has failed to provide direc-
tion to the lower courts, however, because there is an ongoing debate as to which categories of
state statutes of limitation are most analogous. For example, some circuits find tort statutes of
limitation most analogous, while others find such statutes inherently inappropriate for federal
civil rights actions. See infra notes 134-41 and accompanying text.
9. See generally Annot., 45 A.L.R. FED. 458 (1979); Annot., 29 A.L.R. FED. 710 (1976).
10. Various panels of the Eighth Circuit had taken inconsistent approaches to the applica-
tion of state statutes of limitation. This conflict was finally resolved in Garmon v. Foust, 668
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During this survey period, the Tenth Circuit grappled with statute of
limitations issues, but did not articulate a precise standard. Accordingly,
this comment will examine recent Tenth Circuit decisions involving the stat-
ute of limitations to be applied in civil rights actions. The analysis will focus
on two issues: whether the Tenth Circuit is using a consistent standard for
selecting the appropriate statute of limitations, and whether the problems
associated with the Tenth Circuit's approach can be alleviated by adopting
of a different analysis.
I. ALTERNATIVE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS APPROACHES
A. The Direct Analogy Approach
The methods adopted by the various circuit courts for selecting the
analogous state statute of limitations in civil rights cases can be divided into
two general categories: the direct analogy approach and the uniform anal-
ogy approach. The courts in the first category analogize the alleged viola-
tion of federal rights to a common law tort or contract claim based upon the
specific facts pled in the complaint. The practical application of this method
is typified by the view of the Third Circuit that federal courts hearing cases
under the Civil Rights Acts determine the analogous cause of action under
state law, and then apply the limitation period which would have been ap-
plied had that action been brought in a state court. "
A direct analogy can be drawn with relative ease to intentional torts
such as false imprisonment, assault, battery, and malicious prosecution.'
2
Many cases arising under the civil rights statutes have no readily apparent
common law counterpart, however, forcing the courts to draw contrived
analogies. For example, in Pennick v. Florala '3 the Fifth Circuit considered a
suit, based on sections 1982 and 1983 of the Civil Rights Acts, 4 alleging a
lack of notice and opportunity to be heard prior to a zoning change which
allowed a sanitary landfill to operate in the plaintiffs' neighborhood.' 5 The
court held that the alleged due process violations were analogous to a state
court action for trespass on the case (subject to a one-year statute of limita-
tions), rather than an action for trespass (subject to a six-year statute of limi-
tations). 16 Obviously, both analogies were questionable characterizations of
a due process violation. Further, because the direct analogy between the
violation of a constitutional right and an action under common law is inher-
ently imprecise, Pennick demonstrates that this approach allows the federal
F.2d 400 (8th Cir.) (en banc), cert. dented, 456 U.S. 998 (1982), which rejected the use of tort
statutes of limitation, instead requiring the use of state statutes of limitation provided for liabili-
ties created by statute, or similar generalized limitations statutes. 668 F.2d at 406 & nn.I 1-12.
11. Jennings v. Shuman, 567 F.2d 1213, 1216 (3d Cir. 1977).
12. In some states, even these analogies can be problematic. InJennbngs, the federal court
was forced to choose between a Pennsylvania statute providing a one-year limitation for mali-
cious prosecution or false arrest, and a two-year limitation for claims based on false imprison-
ment and abuse of process. Id. at 1216.
13. 529 F.2d 1242 (5th Cir. 1976).
14. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1982, 1983 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).




courts considerable flexibility in determining when a suit is barred by the
statute of limitations.
B. The Uniform Analogy Approach
While the approach described above necessitates an individualized ex-
amination based on the facts of each case, the courts which employ the uni-
form analogy approach avoid this task by applying one statute of limitations
to all civil rights actions. These courts view federal civil rights actions as
intrinsically similar, and seek the state analogue for that intrinsically similar
class of actions. Several different types of statutes have been utilized by
courts employing this method. Some circuits apply general state "catch-all"
statutes of limitations, which govern actions not otherwise provided for. 7
Another alternative used by some circuits is the uniform application of a
state statute of limitations for actions based upon a liability created or im-
posed by statute. 8 Other courts have adopted the state limitation for suits
involving injury to a person or her rights. 19 Finally, some states have en-
acted statutes of limitation which apply specifically to civil rights actions.
2 0
II. THE TENTH CIRCUIT'S APPLICATION OF THE
DIRECT ANALOGY APPROACH
A. Early Cases
Until recently, the Tenth Circuit had not developed a cogent approach
to the problem of determining the appropriate statute of limitations in civil
rights actions. In several early opinions, the court applied state statutes pro-
viding for a two-year limitation on "actions for injury to rights of another
not arising on contract. '2 1 These opinions, however, do not include any sub-
stantive discussion of the court's rationale for using this two-year statute of
limitations.
22
17. See, e.g., Garmon v. Foust, 668 F.2d 400 (8th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 998
(1982), Rinehart v. Locke, 454 F.2d 313 (7th Cir. 1971); Franklin v. City of Marks, 439 F.2d 665
(5th Cir. 1971).
18. See, e.g., Pauk v. Board of Trustees, 654 F.2d 856 (2d Cir. 1981); Shouse v. Pierce
County, 559 F.2d 1142 (9th Cir. 1977).
19. See, e.g., Almond v. Kent, 459 F.2d 200, 204 (4th Cir. 1972) (concluding that every
well-founded civil rights cause of action under section 1983 results in a "personal injury")-
20. See, e.g., Harrison v. Wright, 457 F.2d 793 (6th Cir. 1972), where the court applied
TENN. CODE ANN. § 28-304 (1955) (current version at TENN. CODE ANN. § 28-3-104 (1980)), a
statute of limitation explicitly applicable to federal civil rights actions. Buz cf. Johnson v. Davis,
582 F.2d 1316 (4th Cir. 1978), where the court refused to apply VA. CODE § 8-24 (1950), a one-
year statute of limitation specifically governing section 1983 actions. The court characterized
this limitation as an impermissible discrimination against a federal cause of action, 582 F.2d at
1319. This discriminatory provision has been eliminated from Virginia's current statutes of
limitations framework. See VA. CODE. § 8.01-243 (1977); Steward v. Norfolk, F. & D. Ry., 486
F. Supp. 744 (E.D. Va. 1980), affd, 661 F.2d 927 (4th Cir. 1981).
21. Crosswhite v. Brown, 424 F.2d 495, 496 (10th Cir. 1970) (applying 12 OKLA. STAT.
§ 95 (1951)) (current version at 12 OKLA. STAT. § 95 (1981)); Wilson v. Hinman, 172 F.2d 914
(10th Cir.), cert. denied, 336 U.S. 970 (1949) (applying KAN. GEN. STAT. § 60-306 para. 3 (1935))
(current version at KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-513(a)4 (1976)).
22. The opinions in both of these cases devoted only one paragraph to the statute of linuita-
tions issue. See Crosstwha, 424 F.2d at 496; Wilson, 172 F.2d at 915.
1984]
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The case of Zuniga o. Amfac Foods, Inc. 23 marked the first time that the
Tenth Circuit provided an in-depth analysis of the statute of limitations is-
sue in civil rights actions. In this 1978 case, the plaintiff brought an action
under section 1981 of the Civil Rights Act 24 against his employer, alleging
that the plaintiff was refused reinstatement because of his national origin.
25
The employer argued that because more than four years had elapsed since
Zuniga's cause of action accrued, the suit should be barred under either a
two-year statutory limitation for federally created actions or a three-year
"residuary" statute.26 In the decision the court discussed, for the first time,
the various approaches used in deciding which state statute of limitations
was applicable to section 1981 actions. The court rejected the Seventh Cir-
cuit's method of applying a uniform limitation for all statutory claims,
27
instead adopting the Third Circuit's approach of analyzing the particular
allegations of a civil rights claim and determining the comparable state ana-
logue.28 Utilizing this approach, Zuniga held that the appropriate Colorado
statute of limitations was a six-year period for "[ajll actions of assumpsit, or
on the case founded on any contract or liability, express or implied" and for
"[aJll other actions on the case, except for slander and for libel."
29
Zuniga selected the direct analogy approach because the court found
that approach more consistent with the Supreme Court's decision in UAWv.
Hoosier Cardinal Corp. ,30 which articulated the appropriate statute of limita-
tions inquiry for actions brought pursuant to collective bargaining agree-
ments. Hoosier Cardinal held first that Congress' failure to include a specific
limitation period indicated an intent to adopt the "appropriate state statute
of limitations. '" 3 1 Courts were therefore required to determine how state law
would characterize the federal action, and then adopt the statute of limita-
tions provided for the state analogue. 32 Further, although the question of
the appropriate characterization was ultimately a question of federal law,
33
a state's characterization of the action was to be accepted unless unreasona-
ble or inconsistent with federal policy. 34 Although the Tenth Circuit did not
find Hoosier Cardinal controlling, they found that its analysis dictated use of
the direct analogy approach under section 198 1.3 Applying that approach,
they found Zuniga's action viable.
36
Brogan v. Wiggins SchoolDistrct3 7 was another civil rights case decided by
23. 580 F.2d 380 (10th Cir. 1978).
24. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1976).
25. 580 F.2d at 381, 387.
26. Id. at 382, 387. See COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 13-80-106, -108 (1973).
27. 580 F.2d at 383.
28. Id. (citing Meyers v. Pennypack Woods Home Ownership Ass'n., 559 F.2d 894 (3d Cir.
1977)).
29. 580 F.2d at 386 (quoting COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-80-1 10(l)(d), (g) (1973)).
30. 383 U.S. 696 (1966).
31. Id. at 703-05.
32. Id. at 706.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. 580 F.2d at 383.
36. Id. at 386-87.
37. 588 F.2d 409 (10th Cir. 1978).
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the Tenth Circuit in 1978. Brogan involved an employment discrimination
case brought under section 1983.38 The court noted that Zunga had estab-
lished the appropriate analogy for section 1981 actions, but did not engage
in an analysis of the state law analogue to the employment discrimination
claim. 39 Instead, the court declared that because section 1983 is based on a
policy of protecting fundamental rights, when there is a choice between two
statutes of limitations, the longer statute should be applied.
40
In 1979, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the trial court's choice of a state
statute of limitations in two cases. The first of these cases, Hansbury v. Regents
of the University of California ,41 was a section 1983 employment discrimination
case in which the trial court dismissed the plaintiffs claim as barred by New
Mexico's four-year limitation for actions "founded on unwritten contracts
. . . and all other actions not otherwise provided for." ' 42 The second case,
Spiegel v. School District No. 1,43 involved a Wyoming school teacher who
sought damages under section 1983 for the termination of his employment in
violation of his first amendment rights.44 The Tenth Circuit affirmed the
trial court's application of Wyoming's two-year limitation for "actions upon
a liability created by a federal statute.
'45
In a 1980 case, Brown v. Bigger,46 the Tenth Circuit in a per curiam
opinion affirmed the lower court's dismissal of a civil rights action brought
by an inmate at the Kansas State Penitentiary. 47 The plaintiff, Brown, al-
leged that the prison guards subjected him to cruel and unusual punishment
during his incarceration. 48 The district court held that Brown's section 1983
suit was barred by Kansas' two-year statute of limitations for unenumerated
injuries to the rights of another.49 The Tenth Circuit, without discussion,
agreed with the trial court's choice of the statute of limitations.
50
Two months after Brown the Tenth Circuit decided Shah v. Halliburton
Co. 5 In that employment discrimination action under section 1981 the
court rejected the district court's application of Oklahoma's two-year limita-
tion for "injury to the rights of another ' 5 2 and applied Oklahoma's three-
year statute of limitations for actions on an unwritten contract and actions
38. Id. at 410.
39. Id. a 412.
40. Id. Under Colorado law a court will always be presented with two possible statutes of
limitations, because COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-80-106 (1973) provides that actions brought on
liabilities created by federal statute must be brought either within two years or within a longer
period provided for a comparable state action, if any. Id.
41. 596 F.2d 944 (10th Cir. 1979).
42. Id. at 949. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 37-1-4 (1978)_
43. 600 F.2d 264 (10th Cir. 1979).
44. Id. at 265.
45. Id. See WYO. STAT. § 1-3-115 (1977).
46. 622 F.2d 1025 (10th Cir. 1980).
47. Id. at 1026.
48. Id.
49. Id. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-513(a)(4) (1976).
50. 622 F.2d at 1026. Brown's status as a prisoner tolled the statute of limitations, and
therefore his claim was timely under section 60-513(a)(4). See 622 F.2d at 1026.
51. 627 F.2d 1055 (10th Cir. 1980).
52. See OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 95 para. 3 (1981).
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upon a liability created by statute. 53 Judge Seymour, writing for a unani-
mous court, applied the reasoning of Brogan, which stated that when there is
a choice between two statutes of limitations in a civil rights action, the
longer limitation should apply as a matter of policy.
54
In the following year, 1981, the Tenth Circuit considered a section 1982
housing discrimination action brought by a black purchaser of a home in a
predominantly white development. 55 Although the court in Denny v. Hutchin-
son Sales Corp. 56 held for the defendant, it did state that the plaintiff's action
was timely. 57 Addressing the limitations issue, the court first held that the
time limitations of the Fair Housing Act58 do not apply to a section 1982
suit. 59 The court, however, failed to indicate what the appropriate statute of
limitations should be, concluding only that under Colorado law the applica-
ble statute of limitations could not be less than two years, and the action was
therefore timely.
6 °
In Childers v. Independent School Distrct No. 1,61 a 1982 case, the Tenth
Circuit held that the six-month limitation period of the Oklahoma Political
Subdivision Tort Claims Act 6 2 was not applicable to claims brought under
section 1983 because the short period was "inconsistent with the broad reme-
dial purposes of the federal civil rights acts."' 63 The procedural posture of
Childers did not require the court to articulate the applicable statute of limi-
tations.64 The decision remains significant, however, because in rejecting the
statute of limitations claim the Tenth Circuit accentuated the intrinsic dif-
ference between a state tort action and the alleged deprivation of a constitu-
tional right.
65
53. 627 F.2d at 1058. See OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 95 para. 2 (1981).
54. Id. at 1059. See Brogan, 588 F.2d at 410.
55. See Denny v. Hutchinson Sales Corp., 649 F.2d 816, 819 (10th Cir. 1981).
56. 649 F.2d 816 (10th Cir. 1981).
57. Id. at 820.
58. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3631 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
59. 649 F.2d at 820.
60. Id. See CoLo. REV. STAT. § 13-80-106 (1973). As explained above, Colorado sets a
two year minimum statute of limitations for actions based on federally created liabilities. See
supra note 40.
61. 676 F.2d 1338 (10th Cir. 1982).
62. OKLA. STAT. tit. 51, §§ 151-170 (1981). The six-month limitation period is located at
id. § 156.
63. 676 F.2d at 1343. The court also observed that states generally cannot require plain-
tiffs to "jump through procedural hoops" in order to assert a federal civil rights claim. Id.
(quoting Sethy v. Alameda County Water Dist., 545 F.2d 1157, 1162 (9th Cir. 1976) (en banc)).
64. The Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act was offered only as an alternate ground for
upholding the trial court's FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) dismissal of plaintiffs suit. 676 F.2d at
1342.
65. 694 F.2d at 1342-43 (citing Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 196 (1961) (Harlan, J.,
concurring) (deprivation of constitutional right different from, and more serious than, mere
tort); Shouse v. Pierce County, 559 F.2d 1142 (9th Cir. 1977) (limitation periods must be gener-
ous to preserve Act's remedial purposes); Sethy v. Alameda County Water Dist., 454 F.2d 1157
(9th Cir. 1976) (civil rights plaintiffs not subject to state "procedural hoops"); Donovan v. Rein-





1. Jones v. Hidebrant
In January, 1983 the Tenth Circuit decidedJones v. Hidebrant,66 an ap-
peal from the United States District Court for the District of Colorado.
Ruby Jones brought suit under section 1983 as special administrator of the
estate of her son, who was killed by a Denver police officer. The district
court's decision to hold that the claim was barred by the statute of limita-
tions was reached by characterizing the facts of the complaint as analogous
to the torts of assault and battery, which are subject to a one-year statute of
limitations under Colorado law. 67 The court then applied a Colorado stat-
ute creating a two-year limitation for a federally created liability unless the
period for comparable actions under Colorado law is longer.68 Because the
limitation for the comparable action (assault and battery) was only one year,
the two-year period was deemed appropriate. Mrs. Jones' action was dis-
missed by the district court, however, because more than five years had
passed since the death of her son.
69
The Tenth Circuit reversed this ruling on the ground that the plaintiff's
cause of action was more properly characterized as analogous to the tort of
reckless misconduct, and thus subject to a six-year limitation. 70 In addition,
the court found that application of the longer statute of limitations "com-
ports more favorably with the intent of Congress when it enacted civil rights
remedies."'" The court reiterated the policy expressed in Shah v. Halliburton
Co. that when there appears to be a choice between two different characteri-
zations, the longer statute of limitations should be applied "to effectuate the
broad purpose of civil rights legislation."
'72
2. Clulow v. Oklahoma
Clulow brought suit under sections 1983 and 1985 against the State of
Oklahoma and various individual defendants for alleged violations of his
due process rights resulting in involuntary commitments to mental institu-
tions and suspension from the Oklahoma Bar Association. 73 In his appeal to
the Tenth Circuit, Clulow conceded that the trial court's application of a
two-year statute of limitations was correct, but argued that a tolling provi-
sion should apply.74 Nevertheless, the Tenth Circuit discussed and deter-
mined which Oklahoma statute of limitations was appropriate in this case.
The court stated that the only two available limitations periods were a one-
66. No. 80-2220 (10th Cir. January 27, 1983). Althoughfjones was not selected for official
publication, it retains precedential value equal to a published opinion. 10TH CIR. R. 17(c).
67. COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-80-102 (1973).
68. Id. § 13-80-106.
69. No. 80-2220, slip op. at 5.
70. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-80-110 (1973). See also Hackbart v. Cincinnati Bengals,
Inc., 601 F.2d 516, 525 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 931 (1979) (applying section 13-80-110
to claim of reckless misconduct).
71. No. 80-2220, slip op. at 7.
72. Id. at 8.
73. Clulow v. Oklahoma, 700 F.2d 1291, 1293 (10th Cir. 1983).
74. Id. at 1299. The court rejected Clulow's tolling argument after finding that his claims
did not involve continuing torts and that there was no showing of concealment. Id. at 1300-01.
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year period provided for intentional torts, or a two-year period provided for
"injury to the rights of another. ' 75 Following the Zuniga approach, which
requires a determination of the analogous action under state law, the court
found that the applicable limitation was Oklahoma's two-year period for
"injury to the rights of another." 76 The court justified its choice, by stating
that "most of plaintiffs claims can be characterized as specific torts such as
false imprisonment only by rather loose analogy. The more general tort of
interference with individual rights . . .is a better analogue."
'77
3. Garci'a v. University of Kansas
Garcia's section 1981 and section 1983 employment discrimination suit,
Garcia v. Universy of Kansas,78 was dismissed by the district court as barred
by a Kansas two-year limitation for actions based on injury to the rights of
another. 79 The Tenth Circuit affirmed, stating that the courts, by character-
izing the cause of action as an alleged violation of the plaintiff's constitu-
tional rights, should not be concerned with either how the rights were
violated, the status of the defendant, or the manner in which the cause of
action was created.8 0 The court concluded "that the nature of the cause of
action is the fundamental consideration."8' Citing Crosswhte v. Brown82 and
Wzilson v. Hinman,83 two previous Tenth Circuit decisions addressing the ap-
plicable statute of limitations in section 1983 actions, the court stated that
"injury to the rights of another" most nearly described the nature of plain-
tiff's cause of action.8 4 Hence, the two-year limitation was applicable. 85
Judge Seymour dissented, stating that the majority opinion could not
be reconciled with Shah and Zuniga .86 The dissent expressed the view that
both Shah and Zuniga require an analysis of the particular allegations of the
claim, rather than the "rote utilization of a single type of limitations stat-
ute." 87 Judge Seymour further asserted that the standard adopted by the
majority may present difficulties in some of the states in the Tenth Circuit
because of the diversity among the state statutes of limitations. She observed
that Colorado, Utah, and New Mexico laws, for example, did not contain a
provision similar to the Kansas, Oklahoma, and Wyoming limitations period
provided for injury to the rights of another.8 8 Judge Seymour recognized
that varying limitations periods between states were permissible under the
75. Id. at 1299. See OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 95 para. 3 (1981) (two-year period for injuries to
rights of another); id. § 95 para. 4 (one-year period for intentional torts).
76. 700 F.2d at 1299. See OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 95 para. 3 (1981).
77. 700 F.2d at 1299. The court also noted that the two-year limitation was not "so unrea-
sonably short as to defeat federal policy." Id. at 1300 n.12.
78. 702 F.2d 849 (10th Cir. 1983).
79. Id. at 850. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-513(a)(4) (1976).
80. 702 F.2d at 850.
81. Id.
82. 424 F.2d 495 (10th Cir. 1970).
83. 172 F.2d 914 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 336 U.S. 970 (1949).
84. 702 F.2d at 851.
85. Id.
86. Id. (Seymour, J., dissenting).
87. Id.
88. Id. at 853.
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Civil Rights Acts,8 9 but felt that a consistent analytical framework for choos-
ing the most analogous state limitation was nonetheless necessary. 90 Apply-
ing the framework adopted in Zuniga, Judge Seymour concluded that
Garcia's claim could be characterized as either an action for injury to the
rights of another (two-year limitation),9 1 or an action upon a liability cre-
ated by statute (three-year limitation).92 Under the rationale of Shah, the
longer statute should have been applied.
9 3
III. CRITIQUE
A. Consistency Within the Tenth Circuit
Judge Seymour correctly observed that the majority opinion in Garcia
has deviated from the direct analogy approach announced in Zunga. Zuniga
emphasized that the analogous state statute of limitations should be selected
after "analysis of the particular allegations of the claim," 9 4 that "critical
analysis of the particular claim" was necessary, 9 5 and that prior Tenth Cir-
cuit decisions had pointed the way to the direct analogy approach by "de-
tailing the allegations of unconstitutional acts. ' '9 6 Further, Zuniga rejected
the uniform analogy approach, which requires a court to determine the state
analogue for an entire class of civil rights violations.9 7 Thus, Chief Judge
Seth's majority opinion, insofar as its emphasis on ascertaining the nature of
the civil rights violation98 is indicative of the use of a uniform analogy ap-
proach,99 has created an inconsistency within the Tenth Circuit.
Although Judge Seymour's dissent in Garcia highlights the majority's
failure to follow Zuniga, her criticism fails to acknowledge that the Tenth
Circuit had previously deviated from the direct analogy approach in Spiegel,
Hansbury, and Brown. These three decisions are indicative of the uniform
analogy approach because no attempt was made to analogize the civil rights
claim to its comparable state analogue.i°0 Thus, it would appear that Garcza
crystallizes two inconsistent lines of precedent which had previously arisen in
the Tenth Circuit: Zuniga, Shah,Jones, and Clulow adhere to the direct anal-
ogy approach, while Hansbury, Spiegel, Brown, and Garcia follow the uniform
approach.'0 1 The state of law in the Tenth Circuit is even more complex
89. Id. (citing Board of Regents v. Tomanio, 446 U.S. 478, 489 (1980)).
90. 702 F.2d at 853 (Seymour, J., dissenting).
91. Id. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-513(a)(4) (1976).
92. 702 F.2d at 853 (Seymour, J., dissenting). See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-512(2) (1976).
93. 702 F.2d at 853 (Seymour, J., dissenting).
94. 570 F.2d at 383.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. See Beard v. Robinson, 563 F.2d 331, 336 (7th Cir. 1977). Zunga explicitly rejected the
Robinson approach. 570 F.2d at 383.
98. See 702 F.2d at 850.
99. Cf. Garcia, 702 F.2d at 852-53 (Seymour, J., dissenting) (Tenth Circuit precedent re-
jects an approach failing to analyze particular allegations of a claim; therefore "rote utilization"
of a particular limitations statute is improper).
100. See supra notes 17-20 and accompanying text.
101. The difference in approach cannot be explained solely by the make-up of the panels
hearing the cases. In fact, the same judges have participated in opinions following both ap-
proaches. For example, Judge Barrett joined the opinions in Brown and Spiegel as well as Zuniga.
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than indicated by the existence of conflicting precedents, however, because
there are numerous inconsistencies within each line of precedent.
The uniform approach requires the court to designate one characteriza-
tion which will serve as the state analogue for all civil rights actions. This
characterization should apply uniformly to all states within a circuit.
10 2
Rather than select one statute as appropriate for civil rights actions, the
Tenth Circuit cases following the uniform analogy approach have vacillated
among various possibilities and applied three different types of statutes of
limitations. Hansbury utilized New Mexico's statute for actions founded on
unwritten contract or not otherwise provided for.10 3 Spzegel was decided in
the same year as Hansbuy, yet the court selected a two-year limitation period
for actions based on liabilities created by federal statute.' 0 4 Several months
after Spiegel, Brown ignored the Kansas limitation for liability created by
statute and applied the limitation period for injury to the rights of an-
other.' 0 5 Thus, there is clearly a lack of uniformity among the cases which
apparently follow the uniform approach.
10 6
Similarly, the Tenth Circuit has also misapplied the direct analogy ap-
proach. This approach requires the court to examine the facts underlying
the complaint and then select the most comparable common law tort or con-
tract action.'0 7 In applying this approach, the Tenth Circuit has often
found the most analogous state cause of action to be a general characteriza-
tion, which is indicative of the uniform approach, rather than a specific com-
mon law tort. For example, Judge Seymour's dissent in Garcia suggests that
the appropriate state analogue is "an action upon liability created by stat-
ute"' 0 8 rather than an action upon an implied contract.' 0 9 In Shah, Judge
Seymour also held that a section 1981 claim "can clearly be construed as one
based upon a liability created by statute."'tO These statements are indica-
tive of the uniform analogy approach, despite the fact that the direct anal-
ogy approach is purportedly being followed.
Finally, Childers adds to the difficulties facing litigants involved in civil
Chief Judge Seth also joined the opinion in Zun'ga before he embraced the uniform analogy
approach in Garcia.
102. The fact that all states in a circuit do not have identical statutes does not preclude
application of the uniform approach. For example, the Ninth Circuit has uniformly applied the
limitation for liabilities created by statute. Washington has no such statute. Therefore, the
circuit court examined Washington's statutes of limitation and found that the limitation gov-
erning injury to the person or rights of another best serves the interests which section 1983 was
designed to protect. See Rose v. Rinaldi, 654 F.2d 546 (9th Cir. 1981).
103. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 37-1-4 (1978).
104. WYO. STAT. § 1-3-115 (1977).
105. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-513(a)(4) (1976).
106. Ironically, Spiegel's claim would have been timely if the Wyoming limitation for "inju-
ries to the rights of the plaintiff," WYO. STAT. § 1-3-105 (1977), had been applied. Similarly,
Brown's claim would have been timely if the court had applied Kansas' limitation period for
actions upon a liability created by statute, KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-512(2) (1976).
107. Zuniga adopted the Third Circuit approach, which requires the court to "assess the
similarity of the various state law torts." Meyers v. Pennpack Woods Home Ownership Ass'n,
559 F.2d 894, 901 (3d Cir. 1977), adopted in Zuntga, 580 F.2d at 383.
108. 702 F.2d at 853 (Seymour, J., dissenting); see KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-512(2) (1976).
109. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-512(1) (1976). Although both provisions have identical lim-
itations periods, the problem with Judge Seymour's dissent is her methodology, not her result.
110. 627 F.2d at 1059.
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rights actions in the Tenth Circuit. By emphasizing the intrinsic difference
between federal civil rights actions and state tort actions,' ChtlIders in-
creases the uncertainty in determining the appropriate state analogue.
Moreover, Childers rejected the limitations period of the Oklahoma Political
Subdivision Tort Claims Act by citing authority which contradicts the con-
ceptual framework of the direct analogy approach.' 12
B. Problematic Aspects of the Direct Analogy Approach
Despite the inconsistencies in the Tenth Circuit opinions, the direct
analogy approach remains the only method the court has explicitly ap-
proved for determining the applicable statute of limitations in a federal civil
rights action. This section examines some problems inherent in the direct
analogy approach, and then discusses the implications of those problems in
terms of the policies served by the federal civil rights acts specifically, and
statutes of limitations generally.
1. State Court Decisions in Civil Rights Actions
Federal courts using the direct analogy approach must give deference to
a state court's characterization of that state's statute of limitations ana-
logue."13 Essentially, unless the state court's characterization is unreasona-
ble or inconsistent with federal policy, federal courts must follow the state
decision. I4 Several recent state court decisions have rejected analogues se-
lected by the Tenth Circuit and the federal district courts within its jurisdic-
tion,' 5 thereby creating a possibility of increased inconsistency within the
Tenth Circuit.
In De Vargas v. State ex tel. New A4exzco Department of Corrections,' 16 the New
Mexico Court of Appeals held that the two-year limitation period of the
New Mexico Tort Claims Act'' 7 was applicable to a section 1983 suit
against a New Mexico state employee."1 " DeVargas rejected the analysis set
out by the United States District Court for the District of New Mexico in an
earlier case, which had held that state tort claims acts are based on state
concepts of sovereign immunity alien to the purposes to be served by the
111. See supra notes 63-65 and accompanying text.
112. See Chdlders, 676 F.2d at 1343 (citing Shouse v. Pierce County, 559 F.2d 1142 (9th Cir.
1977); Sethy v. Alameda County Water Dist., 545 F.2d 1157 (9th Cir. 1976) (en banc); Donovan
v. Riebold, 433 F.2d 738 (9th Cir. 1970); see also Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 196 (1961)
(Harlan, J., concurring), cited in Childers. 676 F.2d at 1343.
113. See UAW v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp., 383 U.S. 696, 706 (1965), quoted in Zuniga, 580
F.2d at 383.
114. Hoosier Cardinal, 383 U.S. at 706, quotedin Zuniga, 580 F.2d at 383.
115. DeVargas v. State ex rel. New Mexico Dep't of Corrections, 97 N.M. 450, 640 P.2d
1327 (1981), cert. dismissed as nprovtdently granted, 97 N.M. 563, 642 P.2d 167 (1982); Miller v.
City of Overland Park, 231 Kan. 557, 646 P.2d 1114 (1982). Federal and state courts have
concurrent jurisdiction under the federal civil rights statutes. S. NAHMOD, CIVIL RIGHTS AND
CIVIL LIBERTIES LITIGATION 16 (1979).
116. 97 N.M. 447, 640 P.2d 1327 (1981), cert. dismissed as improvidently granted, 97 N.M. 563,
642 P.2d 167 (1982).
117. N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 41-4-1 to-29 (1978). The two-year limitation period is located at
§ 41-4-15.
118. 97 N.M. at 451, 640 P.2d at 1331.
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Civil Rights Acts, and therefore cannot provide the statute of limitations in a
section 1983 action."1 9 The New Mexico Court of Appeals rejected this rea-
soning and held that the tort claims act is consistent with the purposes of
section 1983, because the act is based on a waiver of immunity which sub-
jects law enforcement officials to liability, consistent with the purposes of
section 1983.120 The New Mexico Supreme Court later dismissed DeVargas'
petition for certiorari, finding no fault with the analysis used by the Court of
Appeals. 121
Miller v. City of Overland Park,122 a 1982 Kansas Supreme Court decision,
held that plaintiffs section 1983 suit was comparable to a state suit for false
arrest and thus subject to a one-year statute of limitations.1 23 Although the
Kansas Supreme Court recognized that in Wilson v. Hnman and Brown v.
Bigger the Tenth Circuit had applied Kansas' two-year statute of limitations
to section 1983 actions,12 4 the supreme court concluded that "when our leg-
islature has specifically adopted a lesser period of time for certain specific
types of action, we believe such time limits should also apply to a § 1983
cause of action .... "125 Although the court justified its decision by distin-
guishing Hinman and Brown,' 2 6 it clearly rejected the Tenth Circuit's policy
of using the longer of two possible limitations periods.
127
Both DeVargas and Miller reject federal precedent, DeVargas explic-
itly 1 28 and Miller implicitly. 129 According to the rationale of Zuniga the
Tenth Circuit should accept the state courts' characterizations and apply
Kansas' one-year statute of limitations if similar civil rights actions similar to
the Miller case arise in Kansas, and the New Mexico Tort Claims Act's two-
year limitation for New Mexico cases similar to DeVargas. Thus, the analogy
approach might require the circuit to abandon its own precedent, and in-
stead adopt the rulings of the state courts. 30
119. See Gunther v. Miller, 498 F. Supp. 882 (D.N.M. 1980).
120. 97 N.M. at -, 640 P.2d at 1331. One commentator, however, after analyzing Gunther
and DeVargas concluded: "[Tlhe thrust ofstate tort law, with its immunity doctrines, is in direct
opposition to the purposes of section 1983." Kovnat, Constitutnal Torts and the New Mexico Tort
Clathns Act, 13 N.M.L. REV. 1, 50 (1983).
121. See DeVargas v. State ex rel. New Mexico Dep't of Corrections, 97 N.M. 563, 642 P.2d
167 (1982). DeVargas has been criticized by New Mexico commentators as failing to accomo-
date the federal policy concerns present in federal civil rights actions, Kovat, supra note 120, at
45-50, and as a source of confusion and inconsistency for New Mexico civil rights litigants.
Comment, Federal Civil Rights Act-The New Mexico Appellate Courts' Choice of the Proper Limitations
Periodfor Civil Rights Actions Filed Under 42 US C § 1983" DeVargas v. State ex rel. New Mexico
Department of Corrections, 13 N.M.L. REV. 555, 561-65 (1983).
122. 231 Kan. 557, 646 P.2d 1114 (1982).
123. Id. at 562-63, 646 P.2d at 118. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-514(2) (1976).
124. Kansas provides a two-year limitation period for actions based on injuries to the rights
of another, KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-513(a)(4) (1976).
125. 231 Kan. at 562, 646 P.2d at 1118.
126. Id. at 560, 646 P.2d at 1118.
127. See, e.g., Shah, 627 F.2d at 1059; Brogan, 588 F.2d at 410.
128. See supra text accompanying notes 117-19. DeVargas also implicitly rejected Hansbugi,
which had applied a four-year statute of limitations to a section 1983 action brought in New
Mexico district court. See supra notes 40-41 and accompanying text.
129. See supra text accompanying note 125.
130. Miller stated that its characterization of the state law analogue was binding on the
federal courts, 231 Kan. at 559, 562, 646 P.2d at 118. This statement is incorrect. See supra
notes 6 and 31 and accompanying text.
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2. Minimal Time Period
In determining the appropriate statute of limitations for a civil rights
action, the court should take account of policy considerations relating to the
federal civil rights statutes. The Tenth Circuit has stated that when there is
a choice between several seemingly appropriate statutes of limitations, the
longer statute should apply in light of the policy protecting fundamental
rights.13' Additionally, the Tenth Circuit has stated that the state statute of
limitations must be "sufficiently generous in the time periods to preserve the
remedial spirit of federal civil rights actions."' 32 The court, however, has not
clearly defined the minimal time period which would be consistent with the
policy of the civil rights statutes.
Some circuits have applied a general rule that a federal court should
not select a state statute of limitations shorter than two years in a civil rights
action. 133 The Tenth Circuit has not officially adopted this principle, but
there has never been a case in which the circuit approved the application of
a limitation period of less than two years. There are states within the Tenth
Circuit, however, which have time limitations of less than two years for cer-
tain tort actions which are most analogous to some civil rights claims. For
example, several states in the Tenth Circuit provide a one-year limitation for
intentional torts such as false imprisonment, assault, and battery, which
might be applicable to a civil rights action. 134 Many section 1983 actions
resulting from wrongful conduct by police officers will be comparable to
these torts. Thus, the circuit court might be faced with the option of apply-
ing a one-year limitation, or of deviating from the approach of selecting the
comparable cause of action under state law. This problem does not arise
under the uniform analogy approach, because the applicable limitation pe-
riod is selected after consideration of the appropriate minimal time
period. 135
3. Fragmentation of the Civil Rights Claim
Another problem that often arises in civil rights cases is that the allega-
tions of the complaint may be comparable to several actions, which are sub-
ject to different statutes of limitations under state law. Again, this problem
131. See Shah, 627 F.2d at 1059; Brogan, 588 F.2d at 412.
132. Childers, 676 F.2d at 1343 (citing Shouse v. Pierce County, 559 F.2d 1142, 1146 (9th
Cir. 1977)).
133. Pauk v. Board of Trustees, 654 F.2d 856, 862 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1000
(1982) (stating that the two-year limitations of 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2680(h) (1976) are an
expression of federal policy which should establish a floor for section 1983 suits).
134. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-514(2) (1976); OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 95 para. 4 (1981);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-12-29(4),(5) (1953). Note, however, that Utah provides a two-year limi-
tation for actions brought against peace officers for injuries caused in their official capacity.
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-12-28(1) (1953). New Mexico does not provide a one-year limitation for
intentional torts. Both Colorado and Wyoming provide at least a two-year limitation for ac-
tions based on liabilities created by federal statute, see COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-80-106 (1973);
WYO. STAT. § 1-3-115 (1977), although under a pure direct analogy approach those statutes
would be irrelevant. Cf. supra notes 106-08 and accompanying text (criticizing Tenth Circuit
for failing to analogize claim to its particularized state analogue).




often arises in cases based on the wrongful conduct of law enforcement
officers.
The Tenth Circuit has never addressed the issue of whether fragmenta-
tion of a federal civil rights claim is consistent with the policy of the Civil
Rights Acts. The direct analogy approach would require that "each aspect
of the complaint . . . be given separate statute of limitations treatment de-
pending on the nature of the specific act or acts complained of."'1 36 The
District of Columbia Circuit recently followed this approach, characterizing
each of the plaintiffs allegations separately and then applying the statute of
limitations for the analogous common law action. 137 This resulted in a dif-
ferent limitation period for the seizure and conversion, false-arrest, and as-
sault components of the claim. 138 It is questionable whether the federal
policy behind the civil rights statutes is promoted by dividing a claim for the
violation of constitutional rights into components according to their com-
mon law counterparts. 1
39
4. Compatibility of the Direct Analogy Approach with the Policies
of the Civil Rights Acts
Another policy question which the Tenth Circuit has not adequately
addressed is whether the very method of drawing an analogy between the
deprivation of a civil right and a common law tort or contract claim is con-
sistent with the purpose of the civil rights laws. Childers observed that
"[s]tate legislatures do not devise their limitations period with national inter-
ests in mind, and it is the duty of the federal courts to assure that the impor-
tation of state law will not frustrate or interfere with the implementation of
national policies." 4° While this statement is particularly apt in a situation
like that of Childers, where the defendant argued for application of the excep-
tionally short limitation period provided in a state tort claims act, the ration-
ale could easily extend to other instances in which specific state statutes of
limitations do not adequately reflect the interests protected by federal civil
rights statutes.
Rather than directly confront this problem, the Tenth Circuit has
evaded the issue by rationalizing its rejection of analogies to certain state
causes of action. For example, in Clulow the court was apparently convinced
that Oklahoma's one-year limitations period for intentional tortsi 4t was too
short in light of the purposes of section 1983. The court resolved this conflict
by concluding that the plaintiffs claim, which arose from his involuntary
136. Meyers v. Pennypack Woods Home Ownership Ass'n, 559 F.2d 894, 901 (3d Cir. 1977)
cited in Zurnga, 580 F.2d at 383.
137. McClam v. Barry, 697 F.2d 366 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
138. Id. at 370.
139. In this regard, the Ninth Circuit has declared:
Inconsistency and confusion would result if the single cause of action created by Con-
gress were fragmented in accordance with analogies drawn to rights created by state
law and the several differing periods of limitation applicable to each state-created
right were applied to the single federal cause of action.
Smith v. Cremins, 308 F.2d 187, 190 (9th Cir. 1962).
140. 676 F.2d at 1342 (quoting Occidental Life Ins. Co. v. EEOC, 432 U.S. 355, 367 (1977)).
141. OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 95 para. 4 (1981).
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commitment to a mental institution, was not comparable to the tort of false
imprisonment because the analogy was too "loose."' 4 2 The ultimate policy
consideration which must be examined, however, is whether common law
tort and contract actions are indeed comparable to civil rights violations.
143
In rejecting the limitations of Oklahoma's state tort claims act, Childers
quoted Justice Harlan's famous statement: "[A] deprivation of a constitu-
tional right is significantly different from and more serious than a violation
of a state right and therefore deserves a different remedy even though the
same act may constitute both a state tort and the deprivation of a constitu-
tional right."' 144 In a similar vein, the Eighth Circuit has rejected the tort
analogy because it "unduly cramps the significance of section 1983 as a
broad, statutory remedy."' 145 The Seventh Circuit has also held that the
analogy approach is inappropriate because of the "fundamental differences
between a civil rights action and a common law tort."' 14 6 Aside from the
practical difficulties in finding a common law analogy for some civil rights
claims, such as those in Spiegel involving the violation of first amendment
rights, it is clear that serious doubts exist as to whether the very process of
comparing a civil rights claim to a common law action is compatible with
the spirit of the civil rights statutes.147
5. Compatibility of the Analogy Approach with the Policies of
Statutes of Limitations
In addition to policy considerations relating specifically to the Civil
Rights Acts, there are pervasive social policies implicated by statutes of limi-
tation. The Supreme Court stated in Board of Regents v. Tomanio 148 that
"[s]tatutes of limitations are not simply technicalities. . . . [t]hey have long
been respected as fundamental to a well-ordered judicial system."' 49 The
Court went on to observe that state statutes of limitation serve two primary
purposes. First, they represent a legislative judgment about the point at
which delay in bringing a claim will impair the accuracy of the fact-finding
process. 150 Second, they prevent undue delay in bringing claims, thereby
142. See 700 F.2d at 1300.
143. Zunqga recognized that there are differences between a civil rights claim and a tort or
contract action, but concluded that these differences did not preclude application of the direct
analogy approach. 580 F.2d at 386.
144. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 196 (1961) (Harlan, J., concurring). See 676 F.2d at
1343.
145. Garmon v. Foust. 668 F.2d 400, 406 (8th Cir.) (en banc). cert. dented, 456 U.S. 998
(1982).
146. Beard v. Robinson, 563 F.2d 331 (7th Cir.), cert. detied, 438 U.S. 907 (1977).
147. This view is not supported by Supreme Court cases. The Court has stated that there is
nothing peculiar to civil rights actions that would justify special reluctance in applying state
law. Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, 421 U.S. 454, 464 (1975). Despite this statement, the
Supreme Court has continually refused to rule on questions involving the choice of an applica-
ble statute of limitations in civil rights actions, leaving the resolution of the issue to the discre-
tion of the circuit courts. See supra notes 7-9 and accompanying text.
148. 446 U.S. 478 (1980).
149. Id. at 487.
150. Id. The accuracy of the fact-finding process is impaired because testimony becomes
increasingly unreliable as time passes. Id.
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settling expectations and preventing litigation of stale claims.15'
Several circuit courts have addressed the relevance of the evidentiary
problem in selecting the appropriate statute of limitations in a civil rights
action. For example, the Third Circuit noted that because a section 1981
violation typically involves documentary proof and a section 1982 claim de-
pends heavily on statistical evidence, a longer statute of limitations is less
likely to impede the proof of facts in section 1981 actions.152 In contrast, the
District of Columbia Circuit has declared that in a civil rights suit against
police officers there are no unique aspects which would make general judi-
cial policies inapplicable to civil rights actions.
153
The Tenth Circuit has never discussed the relationship between the
statute of limitation in a particular civil rights action and the type of evi-
dence necessary to prove the allegations of the complaint. Nor has the
Tenth Circuit examined the possibility, suggested by the Third Circuit, that
evidentiary considerations may require a different standard for determining
a section 1981 or section 1982 statute of limitations than would be required
for a section 1983 claim.
154
The second purpose of statutes of limitation is to protect defendants
from the burden of defending against stale claims and to promote finality
and order in the judicial system. 155 It has also been suggested that statutes
of limitations benefit plaintiffs by providing "a sure knowledge of the time
after which a suit would be futile."' 56 One commentator has observed that
in jurisdictions which have adopted the direct analogy approach the uncer-
tainty regarding the applicable statute of limitations in civil rights actions
has served to encourage plaintiffs to bring suits which might not otherwise
be brought and to appeal adverse decisions.157 A prospective plaintiff could
be advised to litigate a claim if there is any conceivable statute of limitation
under which his suit would be considered timely. Because the Tenth Circuit
standard is so amorphous, there is always a possibility that a claim will not
be barred if the limitation period has not run for some tort or contract action
arguably comparable to the plaintiff's civil rights claim. 158 Similarly, liti-
gants are encouraged to appeal, due to the chance that the Tenth Circuit
151. Set id.
152. Meyers v. Pennypack Woods Home Ownership Ass'n, 559 F.2d 894, 903 n.26 (3d Cir.
1977).
153. See McClam v. Barry, 697 F.2d 366 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
154. Set supra note 149 and accompanying text.
155. United States v. Oregon Lumber Co., 260 U.S. 290 (1922). See also Tomanio, 446 U.S.
at 487.
156. Developments in the Law-Statutes of Limitations, 63 HARv. L. REV, 1177, 1186 (1950).
157. Comment, Statutes of Limitations in Federal Civil Rights Litzation, 1976 ARIZ. ST. L. J. 97,
112 n. 116.
158. An additional source of confusion is the fact that the Tenth Circuit rarely provides an
unequivocal statement of the analogy which is drawn between the state action and the civil
rights suit. This lack of precision is typified by the court's statement in Shah: "'Zuniga appropri-
ately defines a section 1981 claim for discriminatory discharge from employment as having the
elements of both a contract and a tort claim .... [flurthermore, the cause of action can clearly
be construed as one based upon a liability created by statute." 627 F.2d at 1059. The court in
Shah ultimately applied the Oklahoma statute applicable to contract actions and actions upon a
liability created by statute, but never indicated which of these provided the appropriate anal-
ogy with the civil rights claim. Id.
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might disagree with the trial court's characterization of most analogous ac-
tion under state law. Thejones decision is illustrative of this situation.' 59
Under the Zuntga approach, then, litigants can never be certain whether or
not the limitation has expired on a particular claim because one cannot pre-
dict which analogy the Tenth Circuit will deem most appropriate.
IV. CONCLUSION
Zuniga's direct analogy approach allows greater flexibility in determin-
ing whether an action is barred than does the uniform analogy approach.
Shah requires a court to apply the longer limitation when a substantial ques-
tion exists over which state statute applies.160 This method seems to weigh
in favor of protecting the interests of plaintiffs who may have valid claims
rather than the interests of defendants in having to defend against stale
claims.16  The danger of this method, however, is that a court might-
either consciously or unconsciously-manipulate the statute of limitations
according to its evaluation of the merits of a claim.
Additionally, although the Tenth Circuit has ostensibly adopted the di-
rect analogy approach for determining the applicable statute of limitations
in civil rights cases, the court's inconsistent application of this standard has
led to a confusing line of precedent. I62 This confusion has produced an
intolerable situation in which civil rights litigants have no meaningful
grounds for determining whether or not an action is barred by the statute of
limitations. The situation has been further complicated by state court deci-
sions in Kansas, and New Mexico, which will force the Tenth Circuit to
decide whether to accept a state's designation of the appropriate statute of
limitations in certain civil rights cases as binding on the federal courts.
16 3
The optimal solution to this problem would be a congressional enact-
ment 164 providing a uniform statute of limitations for all civil rights ac-
tions. 6 5 Absent any legislative action, and in view of the Supreme Court's
refusal to set a standard in this area, the responsibility for developing reason-
able guidelines rests with the circuit courts.
After a period of inconsistent opinions, both the Seventh and Eighth
Circuits decided that the uniform approach is the most compatible with the
policies of the civil rights statutes. 166 The Tenth Circuit, which has never
159. See supra notes 66-72 and accompanying text.
160. 627 F.2d at 1059.
161. See Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, 421 U.S. 454, 463-64 (1975).
162. See supra notes 100-10 and accompanying text.
163. See supra notes 113-28 and accompanying text.
164. Precedent for congressional action is found in the antitrust area, where the federal
courts had traditionally applied state statutes of limitations. E.g., Englander Motors Inc. v.
Ford Motor Co., 293 F.2d 802, 804 (6th Cir. 1961). In 1955, Congress enacted a four-year
limitation period to govern all antitrust actions. See Pub. L. No. 138, 69 Stat. 283 (1955) (codi-
fied as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 15b (1982).
165. In this regard, one commentator has stated: "Congress should enact at once a period of
limitation to make uniform throughout the country the time when suits can be brought under
§ 1983." C. ANTIEAU, FEDERAL CIVIL RIGHTS ACTS: CIVIL PRACTICE § 241 (2d ed. 1980).
166. See Garmon v. Foust, 668 F.2d 400 (8th Cir.) (en banc), cert. dented 456 U.S. 998 (1982);
Beard v. Robinson, 563 F.2d 331 (7th Cir.), cert. dented, 438 U.S. 907 (1977).
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adequately addressed these policy considerations, should follow these cir-
cuits 16 7 and abandon the direct analogy approach, which has become a
source of uncertainty and confusion.168
Marcze Bayaz
167. An authority on civil rights actions has observed: "Inasmuch as tort principles do not
and should not invariably determine 1983 liability in other areas, Beard represents the better
rule." NAHMOD, supra note 115, at 128.
168. In a decision received after this issue went to press, the Tenth Circuit adopted the
uniform analogy approach for section 1983 actions. Henceforth, those actions will be subject to
the statute of limitations provided for injuries to personal rights. Garcia v. Wilson, No. 83-1017,
slip op. at 27 (10th Cir Mar. 30, 1984).
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